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Advocates of systems thinking approaches argue that accident prevention strategies
should focus on reforming the system rather than on fixing the “broken components.”
However, little guidance exists on how organizations can translate incident data into
prevention strategies that address the systemic causes of accidents. This article
describes and evaluates a series of systems thinking prevention strategies that were
designed in response to the analysis of multiple incidents. The study was undertaken in
the led outdoor activity (LOA) sector in Australia, which delivers supervised or instructed
outdoor activities such as canyoning, sea kayaking, rock climbing and camping. The
design process involved workshops with practitioners, and focussed on incident data
analyzed using Rasmussen’s AcciMap technique. A series of reflection points based
on the systemic causes of accidents was used to guide the design process, and
the AcciMap technique was used to represent the prevention strategies and the
relationships between them, leading to the creation of PreventiMaps. An evaluation
of the PreventiMaps revealed that all of them incorporated the core principles of the
systems thinking approach and many proposed prevention strategies for improving
vertical integration across the LOA system. However, the majority failed to address the
migration of work practices and the erosion of risk controls. Overall, the findings suggest
that the design process was partially successful in helping practitioners to translate
incident data into prevention strategies that addressed the systemic causes of accidents;
refinement of the design process is required to focus practitioners more on designing
monitoring and feedback mechanisms to support decisions at the higher levels of the
system.
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INTRODUCTION
Incident reporting and investigation systems are now widely considered to be
an essential component of safety management systems, and a pre-requisite for
learning from incidents (Nielsen et al., 2006; Lindberg et al., 2010; Jacobsson’s
et al., 2011; Jacobsson et al., 2012). Most organizations have their own reporting
and investigation systems; this is a requirement in the international standard for
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occupational health and safetymanagement (Nielsen et al., 2006).
In safety critical domains, such as process control, aviation
and healthcare, a number of sector-wide systems have existed
since the early 1980s and 2000s (e.g., the Major Accidents
Reporting System, 2012; Aviation Safety Reporting System, 2015;
and the U.K.’s National Health Service Patient Safety reporting
system, Department of Health, 2006). These sector-wide systems
are intended to support cross-organizational learning from
incidents, as well as reforms to regulation and legislation
(Vincent, 2004; Jacobsson et al., 2010; Lindberg et al., 2010).
Concerns have been raised, however, that there is little evidence
that incident data is actually used to identify prevention strategies
or support learning from incidents (Nielsen et al., 2006; Pless,
2008; Jacobsson et al., 2010; Lindberg et al., 2010). One of the
reasons underpinning this is the absence of formal processes for
translating incident data into appropriate accident prevention
strategies1. This article describes and evaluates a new process
for translating incident data analyses into prevention strategies,
based on a systems thinking approach.
Previous Research on Translating Incident
Data into Prevention Strategies
For organizations, “learning from an incident” involves
converting an incident experience into activities that will prevent
future incidents (Jacobsson et al., 2012). Several models in the
literature describe this process as a series of steps, where no one
step can fail without affecting the end result (e.g., Lindberg et al.,
2010; Jacobsson et al., 2012; Drupsteen et al., 2013a). Jacobsson,
Ek and Akselsson (2011,?) “learning cycle” model describes
the following steps: reporting; analysis; decision-making;
implementation; and follow-up. “Reporting” includes the initial
reporting and collecting additional data through investigation
if required. “Analysis” describes the method for analyzing the
data, and designing strategies that prevent similar incidents.
“Decision-making” describes the process for selecting prevention
strategies for implementation. “Implementation” describes
the processes for converting the decisions into action. Finally,
“Follow-up” includes both monitoring the implementation, and
evaluating the impact of the action.
The majority of research examining aspects of the learning
cycle has focused on the methods used to investigate incidents
and analyze the data (for a review see Katsakiori et al., 2009).
In addition, there is a significant body of research examining
the factors influencing initial reporting, and the selection,
implementation and maintenance of prevention strategies (e.g.,
Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000; Lundberg et al., 2010, 2012;
Ramanujam and Goodman, 2011; Le Coze, 2013; Vastveit et al.,
2015). However, little research has focused on the process of
designing prevention strategies, or describing the prevention
strategies that result.
This lack of research into the design of prevention strategies
implies that there is a belief that the analysis of incident data
will automatically lead to new knowledge, new structures, new
1The term “prevention strategies” is used interchangeably in the literature
with other terms such as “prevention strategies,” “prevention activities,”
“recommendations,” “remedial actions,” “corrective actions,” “countermeasures”
and “interventions.”
rules, and new practices that will result in higher reliability
and improved safety once implemented (Lundberg et al., 2010;
Carroll and Fahlbruch, 2011; Drupsteen et al., 2013b). However,
examinations of investigation manuals show that little guidance
is provided on how to design prevention strategies based on the
outputs from an investigation (Lundberg et al., 2009; Rollenhagen
et al., 2010; Drupsteen et al., 2013b). It is therefore unclear how
safety practitioners design prevention strategies from the causes
that are found, or prioritize addressing certain causes over others.
Another issue is that investigation manuals often give little
consideration to understanding how the implementation of
specific prevention strategies might impact on the system as
a whole (Johnson, 2003; Lundberg et al., 2009; Rollenhagen
et al., 2010). The approach to developing prevention strategies
in many organizations is to address each cause identified in
isolation (Johnson, 2003; Lundberg et al., 2009; Drupsteen
and Hasle, 2014). This is problematic as changes to any
system component will necessarily impact on others, and
potentially lead to unintended, negative consequences (Lundberg
et al., 2009; Kirwan, 2011). One reason for this may be that
many investigations are still underpinned by linear chain-of-
event accident causation models. These models focus safety
practitioners on the negative events within an accident sequences
and the “broken” components of the system. The underlying
accidentmodel therefore works against understanding the system
as a whole (Lundberg et al., 2009; Rollenhagen et al., 2010;
Dekker, 2011; Leveson, 2011).
A number of authors have argued that using a systems-
based accident causation model to collect and analyze incident
data might better support addressing problems holistically,
rather than just treating individual parts of the system (Dekker,
2011; Leveson, 2011; Hollnagel, 2012). Systemic models are
underpinned by three core principles of accident causation.
First, safety in work systems is impacted by decisions and
actions made at all levels of the system, not just by human
operators working within the immediate context of the hazardous
processes. Second, accidents are caused by multiple factors
that go beyond the immediate context of the incident. Third,
accidents and safety are described as emergent properties of
systems, arising from interactions between the components
within that system (Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson, 2011). Accidents
and safety are considered to be “emergent properties” as the
outcome of interactions between the components cannot be
predicted from examining the functioning or reliability of each
components in isolation (Dekker et al., 2011; Leveson, 2011).
Based on these principles, it has been argued that prevention
strategies should focus on addressing the factors at the higher
levels of the system that create hazardous conditions and unsafe
acts, rather than directly on failures relating to technology or
human operators (e.g., Rasmussen, 1997; Dekker, 2011). In
addition, it is the authors’ opinion that these principles imply that
organizations need to identify networks of prevention strategies,
rather than standalone ones, in order to address failures arising
from interactions between the components in the system.
A number of systems-based analysis methods have been
developed that represent the contributing factors involved in
accidents as complex, non-linear causal networks (e.g., STAMP,
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Leveson, 2011; AcciMap, Rasmussen, 1997). Many studies have
demonstrated that they provide a deeper understanding of how
interactions within systems contribute to hazardous conditions
and unsafe behavior in a range of safety-critical domains
including space exploration (Johnson and Muniz de Almeida,
2008), aviation (Branford, 2011), rail (Underwood andWaterson,
2014), public health (Cassano-Piche et al., 2009), disaster
management (Salmon et al., 2014a), road freight transport
(Salmon et al., 2013; Newnam and Goode, 2015), and led outdoor
activities (Salmon et al., 2014b, 2016a). Although these studies
have focused on describing how accidents are caused, rather than
how they can be prevented, there is no obvious reason why the
samemethods could not be applied to both analyze accidents and
identify prevention strategies (Salmon et al., 2016b). Potentially,
these methods could be extended to provide a structured process
for translating incident data analyses into prevention strategies.
If this approach is successful, the resulting prevention strategies
should address the systemic causes of accidents.
This article investigates this proposition further by presenting
the findings from a study using a systems approach to accident
analysis and the prevention strategy design process. The study
involved conducting participatory workshops with practitioners
to identify prevention strategies from incident data collected
through a national reporting system from the led outdoor activity
(LOA) sector in Australia. The collection and analysis of the
incident data, and the workshop prevention strategy design
process, were all based on Rasmussen’s (1997) risk management
framework and associated AcciMap technique. The following
sections provide a brief overview of both, along with details of
their application to the LOA sector and the current study.
Rasmussen’s Risk Management
Framework and AcciMap
Rasmussen’s (1997) risk management framework is underpinned
by the idea that work systems can be described as a hierarchy
of multiple levels (e.g., government, regulators/associations,
company, management, staff, work), as shown in Figure 1. The
actions and decisions of those operating within and across
these levels interact, and contribute to the control of hazardous
processes. Safety is maintained through a process referred to as
“vertical integration,” where decisions made at higher levels of
the system (i.e., by government, regulators, and the company) are
reflected in practices occurring at lower levels of the system, while
information at lower levels (i.e., work, staff) informs decisions
and actions at the higher levels of the hierarchy. A lack of
vertical integration can result in a loss of control and accidents
(Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002; Cassano-Piche et al., 2009).
The framework also describes how work practices constantly
adapt and change in response to various external pressures
and conditions. This process, referred to as “migration,” causes
accidents when changes in work practices erode existing control
measures (Rasmussen, 1997).
The accompanying AcciMap technique provides a
methodological framework for analyzing accidents from
this perspective. The method enables analysts to graphically
represent the contributing factors across all levels of the system in
FIGURE 1 | Rasmussen’s risk management framework (adapted from
Rasmussen, 1997).
question, along with the relationships between them (Rasmussen,
1997; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002).
Rasmussen’s framework also makes a series of predictions,
shown in Table 1, regarding accidents and safety in complex
sociotechnical systems. These predictions reflect the three core
principles of accident causation underpinning the systems
approach, and also describe the role that vertical integration
and the migration of work practices play in accident causation.
These predictions have been used to evaluate the applicability
of Rasmussen’s framework and the AcciMap technique in
new domains (e.g., Cassano-Piche et al., 2009; Jenkins et al.,
2010; Salmon et al., 2014a), and to evaluate whether accident
investigation processes adequately support the application of
systems analysis methods (Newnam and Goode, 2015).
In the current study, the AcciMap technique was used
initially to graphically represent the contributing factors,
and the relationships between them, which were identified
from incidents reported in the LOA sector in Australia.
It was also subsequently used to represent networks of
prevention strategies proposed to address these contributing
factors and prevent future occurrences of similar incidents.
Rasmussen’s predictions were used to underpin the prevention
strategy design process, and to evaluate whether the resulting
prevention strategies address the systemic causes of accidents.
These applications are described in detail in the following
sections.
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TABLE 1 | Rasmussen’s predictions regarding performance and safety in complex sociotechnical systems.
1. Safety is an emergent property—it is impacted by the decisions of all actors within the system
2. Accidents are caused by multiple contributing factors, not a single catastrophic decision or action
3. Accidents can result from a lack of vertical integration across levels, not just deficiencies at any one level alone
4. Lack of vertical integration is caused by a lack of feedback across levels. Actors cannot see how their decisions interact with those made by actors at other levels
so threats to safety are not obvious before an accident
5. Work practices are not static, they migrate over time under the influence of a cost gradient driven by financial pressures in an aggressive competitive environment
and under the influence of an effort gradient driven by the psychological pressure to follow the path of least resistance
6. Migration of work practices can occur at multiple levels, not just in one level alone
7. Migration of work practices causes the system’s defenses to degrade and erode gradually over time
Application to Incident Data Collection and
Analysis in the LOA Sector
The research described in this article was undertaken in the LOA
sector in Australia. This sector includes all organizations that
facilitate supervised or instructed “led” outdoor activities, such
as outdoor education and recreation providers, school camps,
adventure tourism operators and outdoor therapy programs
(Goode et al., 2014a). These organizations deliver potentially
high-risk activities (e.g., canyoning, sea kayaking, rock climbing,
camping) in dynamic environments.
In the past 10 years, a number of high profile fatalities have
occurred in Australia and internationally, which highlighted
the need for better methods for understanding and preventing
incidents in this domain (Salmon et al., 2010, 2012). For example,
six students and their teacher died while on a gorge walking
activity in New Zealand in 2008. The coroner and an independent
investigation highlighted multiple contributing factors relating
to the instructor, her manager, the activity center, the local
weather service and government legislation and regulation
(Brookes et al., 2009; Davenport, 2010). Previous literature
on incident causation in this domain had focused on the
immediate context of the incident (e.g., activity leader knowledge
of environmental hazards and experience, supervision, weather),
with little acknowledgement of the factors at the higher levels of
the system (e.g., Curtis, 1995; Brookes, 2003, 2004).
There is now significant evidence that accident analysis
methods underpinned by a systems approach are required
to understand the incidents that occur during led outdoor
activities. Analyses of fatal incidents (Salmon et al., 2010,
2012), near misses, and more common everyday injuries and
illnesses (Salmon et al., 2014b, 2016a) have identified multiple
contributing factors. In this domain, illnesses are viewed as
important as even relatively minor illnesses or allergies may pose
a serious risk in remote or wilderness environments (Goode et al.,
2015).
To support the collection of incident data in the Australian
LOA sector from a systems perspective, the authors have used
Rasmussen’s (1997) risk management framework to underpin
the development of a national incident reporting system (Goode
et al., 2015; Salmon et al., 2016a). The Understanding and
Preventing Led Outdoor Accidents Data System (UPLOADS)
allows organizations to record detailed information on incidents,
including the event itself (e.g., the activity, the participants
and supervisory staff involved), relevant events leading up the
incident, and describe the system of contributing factors that staff
andmanagement perceive to be involved. This data is then sent to
the research team for analysis, and reports are produced annually.
To standardize the analysis of the incident data by the research
team, the authors have developed a domain-specific contributing
factor classification scheme, based on Rasmussen’s framework
and AcciMap technique. The classification scheme, shown in
Figure 2, describes the actors and contributing factors involved
in incidents across the LOA system. The classification scheme
was developed and refined in a series of previous studies (Goode
et al., 2014b; Salmon et al., 2014b; Taylor et al., 2015a,b).
Injury, illness and near miss incident data reported and
analyzed via UPLOADS over a 12 month period (1st June
2014—31st May 2015) were used as the primary source of
information for the prevention strategy development workshop.
The prevention strategy design process focused on three
AcciMaps representing the contributing factors identified from
the injury, illness and near miss data. Due to space restrictions,
only the prevention strategies relating to the injury data are
presented in this paper.
Application to the Prevention Strategy
Design Process in This Study
Rasmussen’s framework and the AcciMap technique were also
used to underpin the prevention strategy design process. During
the design process, the AcciMaps representing the incident data
were used to identify specific goals for incident prevention.
For each specific goal, a network of prevention strategies, and
the potential relationships between them, were identified. Each
prevention strategy identified a specific action and the actors that
would be responsible for implementation. Relationships between
the prevention strategies were used to describe how the successful
implementation of one prevention strategy depended on another,
or how the prevention strategies supported better vertical
integration. The prevention strategies and the relationships
between them were mapped onto the framework shown in
Figure 2 using the AcciMap technique (the resulting diagrams
are referred to as PreventiMaps in this paper).
To guide the prevention strategy design process, Rasmussen’s
predictions were used to derive a series of reflection points
(see Table 2). These reflection points were used by workshop
facilitators to prompt practitioners to think about the incident
data and prevention strategies from a systems perspective. In
addition, a key question for this article was whether this design
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FIGURE 2 | LOA contributing factor classification scheme based on Rasmussen’s framework and AcciMap technique.
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process resulted in prevention strategies that addressed the
systemic causes of accidents. Therefore, Rasmussen’s predictions
were also used to develop criteria for evaluating the networks
of prevention strategies developed during the workshops (see
Table 2).
In summary, the aims of this article are to: (1) describe
the prevention strategies that were developed using a systems
thinking approach; and (2) evaluate the extent to which
they address the systemic causes of accidents as defined by
Rasmussen’s risk management framework.
METHODS
Design
Two workshops with practitioners from the LOA sector in
Australia were conducted to design prevention strategies based
on incident data. Ethics approval was obtained from the
University of the Sunshine Coast Human Research Ethics
Committee.
Participants
Participants were invited to workshops based on their experience
and role within the sector, or role in regulating safety within
the sector. The aim was to ensure that the workshops included
representatives from across the LOA system, including actors
from the following: secondary schools; outdoor education
providers; outdoor training organizations; outdoor sector Peak
bodies; work health and safety (WHS) regulator; and relevant
government departments.
In total, 30 people attended the workshops (Workshop 1 =
20, Workshop 2 = 10). The majority of participants were male
(25 males, 5 females) and had a mean age of 47 years (SD =
9.53), with a mean of 21 years’ experience in the outdoor sector
(SD = 9.52, missing = 3). The number of workshop participants
representing each actor within the sector is represented in
Figure 3 (note that some participants held more than one role).
Workshop Planning Activities
Materials from a systems thinking-based design toolkit (Read
et al., 2015), originally developed for use with the Cognitive
Work Analysis (CWA) framework (Vicente, 1999), were adapted
for use with the AcciMap analyses. The toolkit provides a
structured approach for translating the outcomes of systems
analysis methods into design concepts. The toolkit provided
guidance on who should participate in the workshops and the
type of group discussion activities required during the design
process. Applying the toolkit resulted in a workshop plan and
a set of reflection points to guide the design process based on
Rasmussen’s predictions (see Table 2).
Materials
Incident Data and Analysis
The incident data was collected over a 12-month period (1st June
2014—31st May 2015) by 31 LOA organizations across Australia.
The organizations used UPLOADS to collect information about
the injuries, illnesses and near misses that occurred during LOA
programs during this period. Injuries and illnesses were defined
as any issue that required care. This included any injury or
illness requiring localized care with short term effects through
to fatalities. A near miss was defined as “as a serious error or
mishap that has the potential to cause an adverse event but fails
to do so because of chance or because it is intercepted. For
example, during a rock climbing activity an instructor notices
that a participant’s carabineer was not locked. If the student had
fallen, this may have led to a serious injury.” The organizations
submitted deidentified data to the research team on a quarterly
basis (van Mulken et al., 2016).
In total, 1020 incidents were reported, and 523 reports
described the contributing factors and relationships involved in
the incidents. These reports were analyzed by two members of
the research team. This involved extracting a list of contributing
factors and relationships between them from each report,
discussing any discrepancies and reaching a consensus. The
contributing factors and relationships were then classified using
the scheme described in Figure 2. Summary AcciMaps were
produced for each of the injury, illness and near miss data.
This involved aggregating the contributing factor codes and the
relationships between them across all the incidents within each
type. The number of times the code and relationship appearing
within the data were indicated on each AcciMap. Only the
prevention strategies relating to the injury data are presented in
this paper; Figure 4 presents the AcciMap analysis for this data.
A report was then produced with sections on the injury,
illness and near miss data. Each section of the report included
descriptive statistics (e.g., led outdoor activities associated with
incidents, severity ratings, demographics of people involved),
AcciMaps, tables describing the specific contributing factors and
relationships underpinning the information presented in the
AcciMaps, and text descriptions of the findings.
For the workshop, summaries of the results were produced
for the injury, illness and near miss data. In addition, large
print-outs of the AcciMaps were given to each group, as well as
blank AcciMap templates (i.e., diagrams with the six AcciMap
levels labeled). These were used to document the networks of
prevention strategies generated during the workshop.
Procedure
Two workshops were held; one in Brisbane and one in
Melbourne, Australia. Prior to the workshops, participants were
emailed the aims of the workshop and the incident data report.
The report was provided to give participants time to read through
the analysis in detail.
On arrival at the workshop, participants were introduced to
the objectives of the session and provided written consent to
take part in the study. Participants were then presented with
information about Rasmussen’s risk management framework
and the AcciMap method, and introduced to Rasmussen’s
predictions regarding accident causation. They were then given
a presentation on the key findings from the analysis of the
injury, near miss and illness data, including an overview of the
AcciMaps. They were given instructions on how to interpret
the AcciMaps and data tables within the report and were
given an example of why component-orientated prevention
strategies might be unsuccessful. They were also provided
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TABLE 2 | Reflection points developed for the prevention strategy design process and the criteria used to evaluate the resulting PreventiMaps based on
Rasmussen’s predictions.
Reflection points Evaluation criteria
1 Can you see in the AcciMap how decisions and interactions between actors created
situations where incidents occurred?
The prevention strategies require actions and decisions from
multiple actors (at least three).
This solution relates to one actor, can you think of related solutions that fit in other levels of
the AcciMap structure?
The prevention strategies require changes at multiple levels of the
system (at least three).
How does the solution support interaction/coordination across actors at different levels?
2 Is there an obvious set of contributing factors in the AcciMap that appears to be
important?
Multiple interdependent prevention strategies are identified to
address the specified goal (at least three). These include
mechanisms to support the implementation of prevention strategies
within and across levels.
Could this solution be part of a wider set—what is needed at the level above to make it
work? What is needed at the level below?
3 Can we improve communication and coordination across the levels to improve this issue? The prevention strategies support the flow of information from
actors across and within system levels.Could information flowing upwards be improved?
Could information flowing downwards be improved?
Could information flow within actors at the same level be improved?
To make this idea work what would need to be communicated up to the higher levels?
What would need to be communicated down to the lower levels?
To make this solution work, how does information need to flow between
actors—upwards, downwards, and across levels of the system?
4 Can we improve feedback across levels of the system so that an actor knows the
outcomes of their decisions and actions?
The prevention strategies improve feedback processes to actors
regarding the impact of their decisions and actions.
5 How might financial pressures impact on this solution, especially over time? Is it financially
sustainable? Can we improve this?
The prevention strategies provide mechanisms for actors at the
higher levels to identify or monitor changes to work practices at the
frontline of operation.How might psychological pressures impact on this solution, especially over time? Will
people see its ongoing relevance? Can we improve this?
How could we identify or monitor changes to work practices as a result of financial
pressures or psychological pressures?
6 How might financial pressures at a higher/lower level of the system impact on this solution? The prevention strategies provide mechanisms for monitoring
changes to work practices for actors at the higher levels of the
system.
How might psychological pressures at a higher/lower level of the system impact on this
solution?
7 How could we monitor whether defenses are degrading/eroding over time within
organizations and/or across the sector?
The prevention strategies include mechanisms for monitoring
whether the implementation of risk control measures are degrading
over time.
Numbers relate to the predictions shown in Table 1.
with a simple example of a network of prevention strategies
relating to the prevention of blisters, mapped onto an AcciMap
template.
Next, participants partook in small group discussions, with
each group led by a facilitator. These discussions were audio-
recorded using a dictaphone. The discussions occurred in three
rounds, each lasting approximately 45 min each. In the first
round, participants considered the injury data, in the second
round the illness data and in the third round the near miss data.
Participants remained in the same small group for each round.
There was a total of 7 groups across both workshops.
At the start of each round of discussion, participants
were first asked to review the AcciMaps and data tables,
and discuss the contributing factors. Where participants
offered additional contributing factors that they believed from
experience had a role in the events, these were documented
by the facilitator. Participants were then encouraged to discuss
potential prevention strategies and to consider how prevention
strategies could be linked in a network or cluster of prevention
strategies across the LOA system. Participants could choose
whether to focus on developing prevention strategies to address
specific issues identified in the data (e.g., burns resulting from
cooking and campfires), or the total dataset. The reflection points
were used either to prompt initial ideas or to refine ideas that
were generated by participants. The facilitators documented the
prevention strategies, and links between them, on the blank
AcciMap templates. Each prevention strategy was described on
the AcciMap in terms of the actors primarily responsible for
implementation and the specific actions required (e.g., “National
Parks: change camping permits to improve access to severe
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FIGURE 3 | Number of workshop participants representing each actor within the sector. Ten participants were Activity Leaders in addition to holding
managerial roles within their organization. In relation to the “Equipment, environment and meteorological conditions level,” Senior Managers would purchase
equipment, Field Managers would ensure equipment maintenance and serviceability, and Activity Leaders would use the equipment.
weather camping sites when required”). At the conclusion of
the discussions, the facilitators presented each PreventiMap
to the group, and made any additions or changes based on
feedback.
Data Analysis
Due to space restrictions, only the prevention strategies relating
to the injury data were analyzed for this paper.
The 7 PreventiMaps developed by the groups to address the
key findings from the injury data were represented in Microsoft
Visio. Each PreventiMap was reviewed and amended (to ensure
clarity of description) by the facilitator who had originally
documented it. Audio recordings were used when further
information was needed to provide a more specific description
of the prevention strategies. In addition, where appropriate,
the facilitator created separate PreventiMaps to represent the
specific goals their groups had discussed. This resulted in 10
PreventiMaps representing specific goals for incident prevention
based on the injury data.
To identify similar prevention strategies across the groups,
the PreventiMaps were coded using Nvivo 10. Each individual
prevention strategy was coded into a theme based on:
(1) the actors identified as responsible for implementation
(e.g., Peak body); and (2) the specific actions required
(e.g., lobby the government regarding the need to educate
community on the benefits of LOA). A summary PreventiMap
was then constructed by the researchers representing the
prevention strategies that were identified by the workshop
groups.
In addition, the 10 PreventiMaps representing specific goals
for incident prevention were evaluated using the criteria
presented in Table 2. The evaluation involved examining each
PreventiMap, and giving a “Yes,” “Partial,” or “No” rating based
on the criteria. “Yes” and “Partial” ratings had to be supported
by examples, which were recorded in a table. The evaluation
was initially conducted by the first author, and then validated
by the second author. Any disagreements were resolved through
discussion.
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FIGURE 4 | Factors and relationships identified which contributed to injury-causing incidents. Numbers in brackets indicate the number of incidents the
factor or relationship was identified in. The total number of incidents analyzed was 364. Factors identified in more than one incident are shaded in gray, and
relationships identified in more than one incident are bolded.
RESULTS
This section first presents an overall summary of all the
prevention strategies identified by the workshop groups in
relation to the injury data, as well as an example of a PreventiMap
developed to address a specific goal. A summary of the findings
from the evaluation is then presented. Note that throughout the
results section “n” refers to the number of workshop groups (total
n= 7).
Description of Prevention Strategies
Based on the injury data, the workshop groups identified the
following specific goals for incident prevention:
1. The prevention and management of Activity Leader fatigue
(Group 1)
2. The prevention of burns during cooking activities (Group 2)
3. Improvement of participants’ skills for outdoor activities
(Group 3)
4. Improvement of reporting of pre-existing injuries (Group 3)
5. Ensuring that the difficulty of programmatches participants’
competence level (Group 4)
6. Improvement of communication around participant
competence levels (Group 5)
7. Improvement of participants’ physical literacy (Group 5)
8. Improvement of activity leaders’ competencies around
dynamic risk assessment (Group 6)
9. Professionalization of the career pathway for people in the
LOA sector (Group 6)
10. Improvement of activity leaders’ competencies for dealing
with injuries (Group 7).
Figure 5 shows a summary of all the prevention strategies
identified to address these goals. Notably, prevention strategies
were identified at all levels of the LOA system and in relation to all
actors represented within the UPLOADS classification scheme.
Some prevention strategies specifically addressed improving
communication and collaboration between actors. The majority
of prevention strategies focused on actions required at the
second and third level of the framework. The actors most
frequently identified as responsible for implementation were
Peak bodies and Activity Center Management. The prevention
strategy themes most frequently identified were “Peak bodies:
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FIGURE 5 | Summary of the prevention strategies identified by workshop participants in relation to the injury data, presented according to the actors
responsible for implementing the prevention strategy and the key themes. Numbers in brackets indicate the number of workshop groups that identified the
theme. The total number of workshop groups was 7.
Changes to policies and standards” (n = 6), “Activity Center:
Improve communication and coordination between Activity
Centers, schools and parents” (n = 5), and “Activity Center:
Provision of training for Activity Leaders (n= 6).
All prevention strategies that were coded as “Peak bodies:
Changes to policies and standards” focused on changes to the
Adventure Activity Standards (AAS), which are voluntary safety
guidelines for organizations conducting LOA. For example, to
improve the quality of supervision during programs, Group
1 suggested that the AAS should “...incorporate Activity
Leaders hours of work spent driving, active supervision and
inactive supervision during programs,” while Group 2 suggested
that the AAS should “...include supervision requirements and
ratios around camp craft and camping.” Both prevention
strategies were in response to the finding that “Activity Leader:
Supervision and Leadership of Activity” and “Activity Leader:
Communication, Instruction and Demonstration” were involved
in just under 10% of all injury-causing incidents as shown in
Figure 4.
The majority of prevention strategies coded as “Activity
Center: Improve communication and coordination between
Activity Centers, schools, and parents” focused on improving
communication regarding participant experience, abilities and
pre-existing injuries. For example, Group 2 suggested that
Activity Centers should “improve communication with parents
about child’s previous experience outdoors,” while Group 6
suggested they should improve “...communication between
schools and Activity Centers around participants health and
abilities.” These prevention strategies were in response to
the finding that many injury-causing incidents were caused
by “Activity Participant: Experience and Competence” and
“Activity Participant: Mental and Physical Condition,” which
were identified in 24% and 17% of injury-causing incidents,
respectively, as shown in Figure 4.
The prevention strategies coded as “Activity Center: Provision
of training for Activity Leaders” addressed a range of weaknesses
discussed in relation to Activity Leader skill sets. For example,
Group 1 suggested that Activity Centers should “...provide soft
skill training for co-leaders and distributed leadership,” while
Group 4 suggested “...training for instructors to assist them to
adapt program designs to suit the competence of the group.”
Again, these prevention strategies were in response to a range
of contributing factors relating to Activity Leaders supervision,
competence and decision-making, as well as the incidents
involving issues with Activity or Program design (identified as
a contributing factor in 7% of injury-causing incidents, shown in
Figure 4).
Example of a PreventiMap
Figure 6 shows an example of the PreventiMaps developed
by Group 4 to “ensure that the difficulty of the program
matches participant skill levels.” This was in response to
two of the most frequently identified contributing factors in
injury-causing incidents: “Activity Participant: Experience and
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FIGURE 6 | PreventiMap developed by Group 4 to ensure that the difficulty of program matches participants’ competence level.
Competence” and “Activity Participant: Communication and
Following Instructions.” These factors were identified in 24%
and 15% of the injury incidents, respectively, and were highly
interconnected to other factors on the AcciMap (see Figure 4).
Workshop participants believed that many injuries occurred
because program design did not adequately take into account
Activity Participants’ level of experience in the outdoors, and
Activity Participants were ill prepared for the program (in terms
of both physical literacy/fitness and equipment). Workshop
participants discussed their perception that the skill level of
participants had decreased over time, as children were less
exposed to the outdoors and physical activity in their daily lives
than previously.
The prevention strategies focus on improving communication
between different actors within the system regarding participants’
skills and implementing systems to increase the flexibility of
program design. For example, workshop participants suggested
that the Department of Education should provide more resources
and time to enable schools to prepare participants for programs
and gather information about their skills and abilities, which in
turn, would enable schools to collect and provide information
to Activity Centers on participants’ competence. Activity Centers
would then feed this information down into the development
of programs. Workshop participants also suggested that Activity
Leaders should be able to dynamically adapt programs to suit
the skills of the group. They suggested that training on how
to identify the skills of participants and adapt programs, as
well as specific policies enabling flexibility in program delivery,
would be needed to support Activity Leaders performing this
function.
Evaluation of PreventiMaps
The evaluation focused on the 10 PreventiMaps representing
specific goals for incident prevention (described in Section
Description of Prevention Strategies). The following sections
present the findings in relation to the criteria, with selected
examples to support the ratings. The PreventiMaps are referred
to by the numbers shown in Table 3, which also summarizes
the ratings from the evaluation. Table 4 summarizes the findings
supporting the ratings for the first three evaluation criteria.
Criterion 1: The Prevention Strategies Require
Actions and Decisions from Multiple Actors (at Least
Three)
All 10 PreventiMaps met this criterion. The PreventiMaps
identified between 4 and 7 actors responsible for implementation.
The actors most frequently identified as responsible were Peak
bodies and Activity Center Management. While many of the
contributing factors in the incident data related to Activity
Participants, only one prevention strategy identified Activity
Participants as playing a role in implementation.
Criterion 2: The Prevention Strategies Require
Changes at Multiple Levels of the System (at Least
Three)
All 10 PreventiMaps met this criterion. The PreventiMaps
required changes to 3–5 system levels. All PreventiMaps required
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TABLE 3 | Summary of evaluation ratings for each PreventiMap representing specific goals for incident prevention.
Criteria
PreventiMap Goal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 The prevention and management of Activity Leader fatigue Yes Yes Yes Partial No No No No
2 The prevention of burns during cooking activities Yes Yes Yes Partial No No No No
3 Improvement of participants’ skills for outdoor activities Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
4 Improvement of reporting of pre-existing injuries Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
5 Ensuring that the difficulty of program matches participants competence level Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
6 Improvement of communication around participant competence levels Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Partial No
7 Improvement of participants’ physical literacy Yes Yes Yes Partial No Partial No No
8 Improvement of activity leaders’ competencies around dynamic risk assessment Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No
9 Professionalization of the career pathway for people in the LOA sector Yes Yes Yes Yes No Partial Partial No
10 Improvement of activity leaders’ competencies for dealing with injuries Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Partial Yes
TABLE 4 | Summary of the findings supporting the ratings for the first three evaluation criteria.
Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3






















































































































































































1 X X X X X X X X X X 13 15
2 X X X X X X X X X X X X 13 8
3 X X X X X X X X X X X 9 7
4 X X X X X X X X 6 6
5 X X X X X X X X X 7 7
6 X X X X X X X X X 16 20
7 X X X X X X X X 6 9
8 X X X X X X X 9 9
9 X X X X X X X 6 4
10 X X X X X X X X X 11 19
LOA system levels: 1, Government department decisions and actions; 2, Regulatory bodies and associations; 3, Local area government, schools and parents, Activity Center
management planning and budgeting; 4, Supervisory and management decisions and actions; 5, Decisions and actions of leaders, participants and other actors in the activity
environment; 6, Equipment, environment and meteorological conditions.
changes at the third level of the framework, and overall, they
tended to focus on changes at the three highest levels of the
system.
Criterion 3: Multiple Interdependent Prevention
Strategies Are Identified to Address the Specified
Goal (at Least Three). These Include Mechanisms to
Support the Implementation of Prevention Strategies
within and across Levels
All 10 PreventiMaps met this criterion. The PreventiMaps
described between 6 and 16 prevention strategies, and 4–20
relationships.
Most of the mechanisms identified to support implementation
occurred across levels. For example, a number of prevention
strategies at the higher levels were identified to support the
prevention strategy: “Activity Leaders adapt program design for
their group,” including: flexibility is included in program design;
Activity Centers provide training on how to adapt programs to
suit competence levels; and Activity Centers develop a policy
allowing Activity Leaders to change the delivery of programs
(PreventiMap 5).
PreventiMap 3 included examples of across level support
mechanisms. The prevention strategy “Activity Centers
and Schools improve communication with parents around
participant capabilities” was supported within the level by:
schools improve briefing to parents around required levels of
competence; and Activity Centers develop key descriptors of
competence related to different types of activities.
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Criterion 4: The Prevention Strategies Support the
Flow of Information from Actors Across and within
System Levels
Seven of the PreventiMaps fully met this criterion, and three
partially met this criterion.
The PreventiMaps that fully met this criterion included
prevention strategies to improve the flow of information between
actors both across and within levels. For example, PreventiMap
8 included prevention strategies to improve communication
across and within levels regarding risk assessments. Specifically,
workshop participants identified the prevention strategy “Peak
bodies provide opportunities to talk with Activity Centers
about risk assessment and share experiences” to improve across
level communication, while “Activity providers to provide risk
assessments to parents, and consent forms are signed based
on this information” was identified to improve within level
communication.
The PreventiMaps that partially met this criterion only
included prevention strategies that increased the flow of
information in a specific direction. For example, PreventiMap 7
only targeted the flow of information between Level 1 and Level
2 of the LOA system (e.g., “Peak bodies to lobby government to
establish independent body on physical literacy”).
Criterion 5: The Prevention Strategies Improve
Feedback Processes to Actors Regarding the Impact
of Their Decisions and Actions
None of the PreventiMaps met this criterion. During the
evaluation, it was noted that many of the PreventiMaps failed
to identify mechanisms to monitor the impact of changes to
regulations, policies and procedures. For example, although
PreventiMap 1 describes a range of regulations, policies, and
programs to prevent Activity Leader fatigue, no mechanism was
identified for monitoring actual levels of fatigue.
Criterion 6: The Prevention Strategies Provide
Mechanisms for Actors at the Higher Levels to
Identify or Monitor Changes to Work Practices at the
Frontline of Operation
Three of the PreventiMaps fully met this criterion, and two met
it partially.
The PreventiMaps that fully met this criterion included
prevention strategies to monitor changes to Activity Leader work
practices. For example, PreventiMap 10 included a prevention
strategy specifying that Activity Leaders should receive training
on “understanding and identifying complexities of mental and
physical health issues.” To monitor the impact of this program,
it was proposed that Activity Centers should conduct “regular
appraisals by peers and management to assess performance
strengths and weaknesses to guide additional training.”
The PreventiMaps that partially met this criterion only
implied avenues for monitoring changes to work practices
at the frontline of operation. For example, PreventiMap 7
proposed that the government should provide more funding
for school outdoor education programs, and change the
school curriculum to include outdoor education. Potentially,
government departments would monitor the take up of
this funding and the implementation of changes to school
curriculum; however, this was not explicitly specified by
participants.
Criterion 7: The Prevention Strategies Provide
Mechanisms for Monitoring Changes to Work
Practices for Actors at the Higher Levels of the
System
None of the PreventiMaps fully met this criterion, and three met
it partially.
The PreventiMaps that partially met this criterion only
implied avenues for monitoring changes to work practices
at the higher levels of the system. For example, PreventiMap
7 included a relationship between “Peak bodies to lobby
government to establish independent body on physical
literacy” and “Government to increase funding for outdoor
education programs.” Potentially, the Peak bodies would
monitor changes to funding at the government level, although
this is not explicit. Similarly, PreventiMap 10 specified that
“Activity Centres should set guidelines around the required
number of permanent staff” to address the issues identified
with causal staff lacking relevant knowledge and training.
This prevention strategy would potentially prevent Activity
Centers from hiring more causal staff in response to financial
pressures.
Criterion 8: The Prevention Strategies Include
Mechanisms for Monitoring Whether the
Implementation of Risk Control Measures Are
Degrading Over Time
Two of the PreventiMapsmet this criterion. For example, the goal
of PreventiMap 4 was to improve the reporting of pre-existing
injuries. It was proposed that “data on incidents rates are made
available on the websites of Peak bodies.” This provides a way
of monitoring whether the risk control measures associated with
reporting pre-existing are eroding over time at an industry level.
Similarly, the goal of PreventiMap 10 was to improve activity
leaders’ competencies for dealing with injuries. It was proposed
that activity leaders should receive “Regular appraisals by peers
and management to assess performance.” This provides a way
for organizations to monitor whether the risk control measures
associated with dealing with pre-existing injuries are eroding over
time.
In relation to this criterion, it was noted during the
evaluation that some of the prevention strategies proposed
might have the unintended consequence of eroding risk
control measures over time. For example, PreventiMap
5 focused on increasing the flexibility of the delivery
of programs, with the expectation that Activity Leaders
would alter programs to match Activity Participants level
of competence. However, Activity Leaders might become
more focused on altering programs than ensuring that
existing risk controls are maintained. In addition, altering
programs might unintentionally result in new hazards. No
prevention strategies were proposed to address these potential
consequences.
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DISCUSSION
The aims of this article were to describe the prevention strategies
that were developed by applying a systems thinking approach
during the design process, and to evaluate the extent to which
they addressed the systemic causes of accidents as defined
by Rasmussen’s risk management framework. Using a systems
thinking-based design process, workshop groups identified a
range of specific goals for incident prevention from the injury
data. To address these goals, PreventiMaps were developed
representing prevention strategies requiring actions from all
actors, across all levels of the system. All of the PreventiMaps
required actions at the higher levels of the system, and only a few
focused on the immediate context of LOA delivery. Prevention
strategies involving actions at the frontline of system operation
(e.g., Activity Leaders should adapt programs to suit participants
capabilities) were supported by changes to policies, training
and regulation. The subsequent evaluation of the PreventiMaps
revealed that all of them addressed the three core principles of
the systems approach (Criteria 1, 2, and 3), and the majority
proposed prevention strategies for improving vertical integration
(Criterion 4). However, overall the PreventiMaps tended to
focus on top-down controls, rather than bottom-up feedback
and monitoring of work practices. Therefore, the majority of
the PreventiMaps failed to address Rasmussen’s predictions
regarding the migration of work practices over time and the
erosion of risk control measures (Criterion 5–8). Overall, the
evaluation shows that the design process was partially successful
in helping practitioners to translate incident data into prevention
strategies that address the systemic causes of accidents, and
highlights areas for improvement in the design process.
The findings from this study will be used to improve the design
process in a number of ways. First, the findings indicate that
the reflection points need to be refined to focus practitioners
more on identifying ways to monitor behavior and decision-
making at the frontline of system operation, and designing
feedback mechanisms to support decisions at the higher levels
of the system. To support this aspect of the design process, it
might be helpful to identify specific incidents from the LOA
data where monitoring and feedback processes have failed, along
with examples of successful monitoring and feedback processes
used in other safety-critical domains. Second, the design process
resulted in many, often overlapping, specific goals for incident
prevention and prevention strategies. A further phase in the
design process is required to refine and select specific goals
and prevention strategies. This will require the development of
further evaluation criteria to assist this decision-making process.
The approach used to design prevention strategies in this
paper resulted in different outputs to the component-orientated
approaches described in the literature (Johnson, 2003; Hollnagel,
2008; Lundberg et al., 2009, 2010; Rollenhagen, 2011). For
example, based on an analysis of investigation manuals, Johnson
(2003) describes four general approaches that are used by
organizations to generate possible prevention strategies: the
perfectibility approach; the heuristic approach; navigational
techniques; and accident prevention models such as Haddon’s
(1980; see pp. 565–590 of Johnson, 2003, for a description
and extensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of
each approach). The key difference between the approaches is
the type of “fixes” that are deemed appropriate or effective.
However, all of the approaches focus on developing a list
of prevention strategies; each item on the list is intended to
address a specific component of the problem identified in the
incident analysis. No consideration is given to the relationships
between prevention strategies or the interactions between them
once implemented. The approach used in this study allowed
participants to understand the interdependencies between the
solutions they were proposing, and to identify the mechanisms
needed to support implementation across the system.
It should be acknowledged that the group problem solving
approach to designing prevention strategies is not novel,
although it does not appear to be consistently used across
industries (Lundberg et al., 2010; Rollenhagen et al., 2010;
Rollenhagen, 2011). In the context of Swedish nuclear power
plants, Rollenhagen (2011) notes that problem solving groups
that include representatives from the whole system of interest
are perceived as more successful in identifying more effective
prevention strategies. He attributes the perception of success to
increasing actors understanding of the system functions they do
not directly influence, and of the consequences of their decisions
for other functions. The key difference between earlier studies
and the current study is the boundary on the “system of interest.”
In this study, the system included actors outside the context of the
organization (e.g., Peak bodies,WHS regulators, and government
departments). These actors had a detailed understanding of
the guidelines, regulations, government policies, programs, and
funding influencing LOA provision. This knowledge may have
helped representatives from LOA providers think outside the
“silo” of their organization, and consider the sector as a whole.
An unaddressed question from this study is the practicality of
the prevention strategies proposed and whether the prevention
strategies are likely to be implemented by the sector. For
example, resource constraints are typically a significant factor
that moderate the success of the prevention strategies proposed
in response to incidents (Lundberg et al., 2010). The next phase
of the research program involves inviting the whole sector to
evaluate of the feasibility of the prevention strategies. However,
it is acknowledged that even if the prevention strategies are
favorably assessed by the sector, there are many factors that will
influence their implementation (e.g., Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000;
Lundberg et al., 2010, 2012; Ramanujam and Goodman, 2011; Le
Coze, 2013; Vastveit et al., 2015). A direction for future research
is to chart the barriers to implementing system reforms that exists
within the LOA sector.
The limitations of the study should be acknowledged, which
also present some directions for future research. One significant
limitation of the present study is a lack of comparison groups.
For example, until the implementation of UPLOADS, the
sector did not have good quality incident data to focus their
preventative efforts (Goode et al., 2014a, 2015; Salmon et al.,
2016a). Therefore, the same prevention strategies may have
been identified based on the incident data analysis, without the
design process. However, it seems unlikely that the networks
of prevention strategies would have been generated without
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the design process or application of the AcciMap technique.
To address this issue, the authors plan to conduct controlled
trials to compare the design process against unstructured group
brainstorming sessions. In addition to evaluating the extent to
which the proposed prevention strategies address the systemic
causes of accidents, a scale developed by Jacobsson’s et al. (2011)
will be used to evaluate their potential effectiveness. This scale
evaluates the effectiveness of prevention strategies on three
dimensions: geographical application, degree of organizational
learning, and time. More effective prevention strategies are
those that apply across the organization, target the redesign
of organizational systems, and involve plans for long term
maintenance. The authors also plan to evaluate potential
improvements in prevention strategies, and modifications to
the design process, as the process is implemented in an
organization over an extended period of time. Future studies
are also required to determine the training requirements of
implementing the design process in an organization to ensure
that it produces valid outputs (Stanton and Stevenage, 1998;
Stanton, 2016).
A second limitation of this study was that two important
actors were missing from the workshops—activity participants
and the parents of children involved in the activities—the LOA
sector’s “consumers.” These actors may have a different view on
the factors that would encourage them to play a more active role
in managing risk. Accordingly, it is recommended that they are
represented at future workshops.
In conclusion, the approach applied in this study allowed
practitioners to create networks of prevention strategies designed
to address the conditions at the higher levels of the LOA system.
This approach to prevention strategy design is not only novel
for the LOA sector, but across the safety critical domains.
To the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first reported to
apply Rasmussen’s Risk Management Framework and AcciMap
technique to incident data collection, incident analysis and
prevention strategy design, all as part of an integrated process.
Most importantly, the prevention strategies were designed by the
actors within the system of interest, rather than by researchers
studying the system. We encourage further applications of
the approach, and future research should consider how these
methods might apply to the next steps in the learning cycle
(Jacobsson et al., 2012): decision-making, implementation and
follow-up.
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